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I.

INTRODUCTION

“I can’t breathe.”1 These were the last words uttered by Eric Garner on July 17, 2014.2 Not
once, not twice, but eleven times, Eric Garner pleaded to the New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) officer who had placed him in a chokehold, “I can’t breathe.”3 And what heinous crime
was Eric Garner accused of committing that justified this use of force? Selling untaxed cigarettes.4
Eric Garner was not the first unarmed black man to have a fatal encounter with the police, nor was
he the last.5 The deaths of Eric Garner and several others led to protests and demonstrations against
police brutality, with Eric Garner’s fatal words becoming a rallying cry for the Black Lives Matter
movement.6
The incident was captured on video, the Medical Examiner ruled Eric Garner’s death to be
a homicide, the NYPD Commissioner announced at a press conference that Eric Garner appeared
to have been put in a chokehold as defined in the department’s guide, and such chokeholds are
prohibited by the department.7 Despite this all, a Richmond County grand jury declined to indict
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Daniel Pantaleo, the NYPD officer responsible for Eric Garner’s death. 8 Just as Eric Garner was
neither the first nor the last unarmed black man to have a fatal encounter with the police,9 Daniel
Pantaleo was neither the first nor the last officer to avoid charges after such an encounter
occurred.10
This recent wave of non-indictments of police officers involved in fatal encounters with
unarmed black men has led to an increase in public scrutiny of how our criminal justice system
handles cases where police are the defendants.11 Prosecutors work hand-in-hand with police
officers on a daily basis.12 Prosecutors rely on the police to provide evidence and testimony for
their cases.13 A district attorney’s office would likely not be able to operate without the assistance
and cooperation of local police officers. And yet, we expect those same prosecutors, who are
relying on the police for their cooperation one day, to turn around and prosecute them the next
day.14 Prior to her election as New York State Attorney General, Letitia James stated “it’s
unrealistic to expect even the best district attorney to be absolutely impartial in cases where they
are asked to prosecute a police officer.”15 Further, whether a bias actually exists or not, the
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perception of bias undermines public trust in our criminal justice system and creates problems that
go far beyond any individual case.16
This Paper argues that, in order to avoid the perception of bias, an independent, special
prosecutor should be appointed to handle cases of police misconduct. Part II will examine the
background and history of the interaction between police officers and the district attorney’s
offices.17 In Part III, this Paper will analyze the main ethical issue involved in the prosecution of
police misconduct—conflict of interest—and the impact it has on our system.18 In Part IV, this
Paper will propose removal of cases involving police misconduct from the district attorney’s
office, focusing mainly on a solution for New York State, assess the various options for removal,
and discuss whether removal should apply in all cases of police misconduct, or be limited to those
cases involving fatalities.19
II.

INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
A. Assistance in Prosecuting Cases

If you walk into a district attorney’s office on any given day, you will undoubtedly
encounter at least one, if not several police officers. Prosecutors rely on the police throughout
virtually every stage of the prosecution.20 A prosecutor’s case could end before it even starts, if a
police officer makes a mistake. The district attorney’s office relies on police officers to properly
collect and preserve evidence, investigate criminal offenses, make arrests, file a police report with
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all relevant facts, conduct witness interviews, turn over body worn camera footage, and provide
crucial testimony if the case goes to trial.21
Let’s use a homicide as an example. The police hear a gun shot. They turn the corner and
see one man with a gunshot wound on the ground and another man running in the opposite
direction. They run after him, stop him, pat him down, remove a gun from his waist band, and
place him under arrest. They bring him down to the station and interview him, at which point he
gives a full confession. Throughout everything that just happened, there were several legal issues
that may potentially impact the case.22 Did the search and seizure comply with the Fourth
Amendment?23 Was the confession given voluntarily under the Fourteenth Amendment?24 Was
the suspect given Miranda warnings?25 If the suspect waived his Miranda warnings, was that
waiver made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily? 26 If the answer to any of these questions is
no, a prosecutor is going to have a difficult time obtaining a conviction, regardless of how strong
the evidence of guilt is.
At the end of the day, a police officer’s job is to investigate crimes and make arrests. 27
They do not have the same incentives as prosecutors to ensure that arrests, confessions, and
searches are constitutional.28 Therefore, “respect for their prosecutorial coworkers plays a critical
role in ensuring that an arrest turns into a conviction.”29 Without that respect, police officers don’t
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have the same incentive to try as hard to abide by constitutional safeguards because, at the end of
the day, after the arrest, their primary job is done.
Prosecutors are required to turn over certain documents to the defense as part of
discovery.30 This includes, but is not limited to, statements made by the defendant to a police
officer, police reports, police notes, and body-worn-camera footage, 31 most of which is in the
possession of the police officers who responded to the scene or conducted the interview.
Prosecutors are obligated to turn over these documents no later than fifteen days after the
defendant’s arraignment.32 They also must submit a certificate of compliance stating that they have
turned over all known discoverable materials.33 If the prosecutor fails to turn over these documents
within fifteen days or fails to submit a certificate of compliance, they cannot be deemed ready for
trial, and their case may be dismissed.34 Therefore, prosecutors rely on the police to turn over these
documents in a timely matter.
Finally, prosecutors rely on police for their testimony.35 When it comes to prosecutors
having a desire to foster good working relationships with the police, testimony is arguably the
most important piece. Prosecutors rely on police testimony in various stages including the grand
jury, hearings, and trials.36 However, it is not as simple as an officer getting on the stand and
recounting what happened. There are many scenarios where a bad relationship between an officer
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and a prosecutor can lead to detrimental consequences in a prosecutor’s case.37 For example,
sometimes a prosecutor must ask confrontational questions on direct examination if an officer has
an admissible disciplinary record.38 If the prosecutor does not bring it up, the defense attorney will
surely bring it up on cross examination and then it will look like the prosecutor or the police officer
was trying to hide it.39 However, if the prosecutor and the police officer do not have a good working
relationship, this line of questioning may cause the police officer to become defensive or angry.40
Further, “numerous assistant district attorneys have reported at least one or two cases that grand
jurors rejected in part because of ‘the attitude or incompetence of the primary police witness.’”41
Therefore, it is imperative that prosecutors maintain a good working relationship with police
officers to ensure their cases are not negatively impacted.42
B. Political and Financial Support
District attorneys are elected in forty-five states, including New York.43 It is not uncommon
for police organizations to contribute to political campaigns of district attorneys.44 “[P]olice
associations from San Jose and Los Angeles donated nearly $600,000 to DA’s during 2018
elections in the Bay Area, including Alameda District Attorney Nancy O’Malley.”45 Most notably,
Fremont’s police union donated $10,000 to her re-election campaign while her office was
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investigating three of their officers’ actions in the fatal shootings of two separate people. 46 All
three officers were later cleared of wrongdoing.47
The Sacramento District Attorney Anne Marie Schubert also faced scrutiny for certain
campaign contributions.48 In 2018, she received $10,000 from the California Statewide Law
Enforcement Association just two days after police shot and killed Stephon Clark, an unarmed
black man, and $3,000 from another police union, the Sacramento County Alliance of Law
Enforcement, three days later.49 Nearly a year later, District Attorney Schubert announced that the
officers responsible for Clark’s death would not face criminal charges.50
Police unions also hold large political influence over the elections of their local district
attorneys, even without making financial donations.51 “When a powerful police union charges that
a politician is ‘soft on crime,’ that candidate's chances for election or reelection can be dramatically
reduced.”52 Therefore, if a district attorney’s office chooses to prosecute police-defendants, the
district attorney will likely face the possibility that he or she will not be reelected if she crosses the
powerful police unions.53
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III.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN PROSECUTING CASES OF POLICE MISCONDUCT

Not only does a conflict of interest between the district attorney’s office and the police
officer being prosecuted create a risk that the officer will not be held accountable for his actions,
an actual or perception of bias undermines the public’s confidence and trust in the criminal justice
system.54 Subpart A discusses the prosecution of police officers,55 Subpart B discusses the ethical
issue of conflict of interest, both generally as well as in the context of police prosecution, 56 Subpart
C addresses the impact the perception of bias has on our system of criminal justice,57 and Subpart
D addresses the affect the perception of bias has on local communities by undermining their trust
in the system.58
A. Prosecuting their Partners
As discussed in Part II, the prosecutors in the district attorney’s office work closely with
police officers on a regular basis.59 When those police officers are accused of police misconduct,
the district attorney’s office is tasked with prosecuting them.60 It is absurd to ask prosecutors to
“simply switch roles from ally to adversary the moment an officer is accused of criminal
wrongdoing.”61
When the district attorney’s office handles cases of police misconduct, there is a risk that
they will decline to prosecute police due to a conflict of interest rather than lack of evidence or
lack of guilt.62 A study regarding the prosecution of police officers involved in police misconduct
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was conducted from April 2009 to December 2010.63 During that time, 8,300 credible reports were
filed against nearly 11,000 law enforcement officers.64 However, only 3,238 resulted in criminal
charges, of which only 1,063 resulted in a conviction.65
When looking at the data specific to excessive force cases, the results are similar.66 The
study found that during the same time period 2,716 officers were accused of using excessive
force.67 However, only about 200 of those officers were actually charged, and of those charged,
only seventy-seven were actually convicted.68 Most significantly, out of all the excessive force
cases, 430 were accused of killing a person using excessive force, yet only thirty of those officers
were charged, and only half of those thirty were actually convicted.69 This data makes it clear that
the conflict of interest is interfering with the district attorney’s office’s ability to objectively ensure
that justice is served in these cases.
If you look back at the Introduction section of this Paper, you’ll see that it was in fact the
grand jury that declined to indict Daniel Pantaleo for the death of Eric Garner.70 Some may argue
that it “would be wrong to blame the prosecutor for the grand jury's decision not to indict. It is
ultimately up to the grand jury to decide the officer's fate, and it is not the prosecutor's fault if a
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jury gives the officer the benefit of the doubt.”71 However, police officer-defendants often receive
differential treatment at the grand jury stage than their civilian-defendant counterparts.72
As previously mentioned, just as Eric Garner was neither the first nor the last unarmed
black man to have a fatal encounter with the police, Daniel Pantaleo was neither the first nor the
last officer to avoid charges after such an encounter occurred.73 Less than one month later, Michael
Brown, an eighteen-year-old unarmed black man, was fatally shot by a white police officer in
Ferguson, Missouri.74 A grand jury declined to indict him.75 In that case, the prosecutor treated the
grand jury proceedings like a trial, with his presentation spanning three months and involving over
seventy hours of testimony, which is uncommon and a typical civilian-defendant would arguably
not receive such treatment.76 The prosecutor called more than sixty witnesses, including the
defendant himself, which is extremely rare in grand jury proceedings.77 The transcripts of the grand
jury proceedings show that the prosecutor assertively questioned potential prosecution witnesses
by probing to find prior inconsistent statements, almost taking on the role of a defense attorney
rather than a prosecutor.78 Lastly, the prosecutor never suggested what charges the grand jury
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should consider, which is unusual behavior for a prosecutor.79 Overall, it is clear that the
prosecutor’s actions throughout the grand jury proceedings display, at a minimum, preferential
treatment towards police officer-defendants over civilian-defendants.80 Nearly all cases presented
to grand juries result in indictments when the defendant is a civilian,81 and yet the failure to indict
has become a routine outcome for cases where the defendant is a police officer.82
B. Conflict of Interest
When prosecutors go from allies to adversaries, there is a clear conflict of interest. The
question is whether this violates any ethical rules. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have
adopted a version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.83 The rules cover a wide range of
conduct, but the only rule that specifically addresses the behavior of prosecutors is rule 3.8: Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.84 Rule 3.8 fails to address relations with the police.85 It also fails
to address any conflict of interest.
When looking at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the rule that generally discusses
conflicts of interest is rule 1.7.86 However, rule 1.7 deals with conflicts of interest with private
lawyers who represent clients, not prosecutors representing the People.87 Rule 1.7 states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more

79
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clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client,
a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.88
Such a rule cannot be easily applied to the role of a prosecutor. First, provision (1) will never apply
as the representation of one client will never be directly adverse to another considering there is
only one ongoing client: the People.89 Again, with provision (2), there is no risk that the lawyer’s
responsibilities will be materially limited by their responsibilities to another client or former client,
as they do not have any. One could argue that the prosecutor has a personal interest in maintaining
a good relationship with the police officers; however, the real conflict of interest is that the office
as a whole has an interest in maintaining a good relationship with the police officers.90 Therefore,
rule 1.7 does not adequately address the ethical issue at hand. As a result, the district attorney’s
office is free to continue prosecuting, or in reality, neglecting to prosecute police officers charged
with misconduct without issue.91 While this Paper only focuses on solutions for the actual
prosecution of cases, it is worth noting that an additional Model Rule of Professional Conduct
relating to this issue, or an amendment to an existing rule, might be a potential solution worth
looking into as well.92
C. Perception of Bias
The Supreme Court has stated that “what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but
its appearance.”93 Perhaps some of those 8,300 credible reports where officers were accused of
misconduct but did not lead to an officer being charged was not because of a conflict of interest,
but because of lack of evidence or some other valid reason. The problem is that, because these

88
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, The Client of the Prosecutor § 3-1.3 (4th ed.
2017).
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investigations and decisions are made behind closed doors, the perception of bias will always
exist.94 For example, perhaps the investigation into the death of Stephon Clark95 revealed that the
officer’s use of force really was justified. The payments from the police unions to District Attorney
Schubert96 as well as the general relationship between the police and the district attorney’s office
create a perception of bias that will prevent the public from ever believing that a fair and just result
was achieved, whether that is true or not.97 The public’s thought process imaginably looks
something like this:
In what universe would she ever hold them accountable? Ever? Any reasonable
person would understand that all of these donations and loans from the law
enforcement community create the appearance of a serious conflict of interest
for a district attorney. How in the world is a prosecutor ever supposed to be
objective in the pursuit of justice when it comes to police misconduct if the votes
and money from those very officers helped them get into office? 98
D. Undermining Public Trust in the System
As a result of the perception of bias, comes the consequence of a loss of trust in the criminal
justice system as a whole.99 “As one commentator noted regarding the deaths of Brown and Garner,
‘broad cross-sections of the public have lost trust in local law enforcement agencies due to their
perception of biased investigations of such deadly-force incidents.’”100 Prosecutors are meant to
serve as ministers of justice.101 However, there is currently a public perception that white police
officers are not being held accountable by prosecutors—a poll conducted in 2014 found that only

94
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37 percent of people believed that the criminal justice system could be trusted to deal with police
officer-defendants.102
Not only does police brutality directly have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities,
as black men are 2.5 times more likely to be killed by police during their lifetime than white men,103
the indirect impact also disparately impacts minorities by undermining their trust in the criminal
justice system.104 When the white officers responsible for killing unarmed black men are not
criminally charged, we are painting a picture for the black members of our community of “white
officers escaping judgment for the killing of black victims.”105 These often are the same
prosecutors responsible for putting thousands of minorities in prison.106 It is easy to understand
why these minority communities who are disproportionately affected by mass incarceration107
would be enraged to see those responsible for the death of their family members, friends, and
community members walk free, when those same prosecutors have no trouble incarcerating
members of their community for much less. By allowing the district attorney’s office to prosecute
the same officers that they work closely with on a daily basis, we are causing further damage to
these communities’ perception that the criminal justice system is fair.108
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IV.

CASES OF POLICE MISCONDUCT SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO AN INDEPENDENT
PROSECUTOR

Whether there is an actual conflict of interest or merely a perception of bias, the most
beneficial solution is to appoint an independent, special prosecutor.109 “Automatically removing a
local prosecutor spares her from having to balance the public's desire for police accountability and
the police officers' indignation at being over-scrutinized, thus preserving the local prosecutor's
relations with both her constituency and law enforcement partners.”110 Subpart A will discuss the
various options for determining who should be the independent prosecutor, while analyzing the
benefits and drawbacks of each option.111 Subpart B will discuss the logistics of which types of
cases the independent prosecutor should have jurisdiction over.112 Subpart C will discuss the
general arguments against the appointment of an independent prosecutor.113
A. Who Should Be the Independent Prosecutor?
1. Prosecution by the State Attorney General’s Office
While the Richmond County grand jury’s decision not to indict Daniel Pantaleo caused
quite the uproar, some good did come out of it.114 Following this decision, former New York State
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman called upon Governor Andrew Cuomo to name him special
prosecutor for incidents of police-involved deaths of unarmed civilians.115 On July 8th, 2015,
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Governor Cuomo issued an executive order doing just that.116 Governor Cuomo’s executive order
addresses the public’s concern that incidents involving the deaths of unarmed civilians cannot be
prosecuted by local district attorney’s offices without conflict or bias, or the perception thereof.117
However, this executive order has yet to be codified into law.118 Executive orders are not
permanent, and advocates and victims’ families have been pushing for this executive order to be
written into law to ensure cases of police misconduct are permanently brought under the attorney
general’s jurisdiction.119 If this proposal were to be codified into law, it would establish an Office
of Special Investigation within the Office of the Attorney General in New York State to investigate
and, where necessary, prosecute police officers involved in the deaths of civilians.120 This solution
is beneficial because it provides a centralized office to investigate and prosecute these crimes,
whereas the latter two solutions that will be discussed in Subparts 2121 and 3122 are still
investigating and prosecuting various other types of crimes.123
The main drawback of appointing the attorney general as the independent prosecutor is that
the state attorney general generally lacks the expertise and exposure to the criminal justice system
necessary to prosecute cases of police misconduct.124 “[T]he vast majority of the Attorney
General's criminal prosecutorial powers were constrained to financial schemes such as securities
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fraud, money laundering, and consumer fraud conspiracies.”125 On the other hand, prosecutors
have historically been tasked with handling cases involving police misconduct, both fatal and nonfatal.126 Therefore, the district attorney’s office is the more competent option to handle these cases
as they are more familiar with the evidentiary standards that need to be met in order to convict
police officers.127
2. Prosecution by a Different County’s District Attorney’s Office
One alternative to creating an Office of Special Investigation within the Attorney General’s
Office to investigate police cases is removal to a district attorney’s office from a different
jurisdiction in the state.128 This alternative is likely the most cost efficient and simplistic as it does
not require creating any new agencies or any further training.129 Contrary to the attorney general’s
office, who may be unfamiliar with prosecuting these types of cases, no extra training would be
necessary for the district attorney’s office in a different jurisdiction in the same state to take on
this role.130
However, this solution might not do much to solve the issue of a perception of bias or
conflict of interest. In a state such as New York, the NYPD works with several district attorney’s
offices on a regular basis, and therefore, even moving a case to a neighboring district attorney’s
office might not make a difference.131 Further, these prosecutors may have developed a partiality
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in favor of law enforcement generally that is likely to lead to a conflict of interest or perception of
bias, even if they do not work with those same police officers on a day-to-day basis.132
3. Prosecution by Federal Prosecutors
The final alternative is to appoint federal prosecutors as independent prosecutors for cases
where police are involved in civilian fatalities. The main benefit to this solution is that, because
they work at the federal level, they are generally not beholden to local police in the way that state
prosecutors are.133 They are also appointed, rather than elected, so there is an appearance of
impartiality due to political insulation that the district attorney’s office and the state attorney
general’s office both do not have.134 Nonetheless, there are many concerns with this solution. First,
because federal prosecutors are not elected, they are not directly answerable to the local
communities that are being affected by this issue, which may lead to insensitivity to community
rights and values.135 “Federal prosecutors are less likely than their local counterparts to serve as
sources of accountability for police brutality.”136 Secondly, federal prosecutors would require
training in state criminal law and evidentiary rules given that they practice in federal court; 137
although not a major ordeal, it would take some time and money. Finally, the federal system deals
with many of the same class and race problems that the local criminal justice systems deal with,
so there is no saying that federal prosecutors will be any more inclined to prosecute a white police
officer for the death of an unarmed black man than a state prosecutor would be.138
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B. Which Types of Police Misconduct Should Be Appointed to an Independent
Prosecutor?
Once it is decided who will handle the cases, the next question to decide is which types of
cases will the independent prosecutor have jurisdiction over? There are four main options: all cases
of police misconduct, all cases involving excessive use of force, all cases involving civilian
fatalities, or only those cases of officer-involved fatalities where the citizen was unarmed. There
is no doubt that nonviolent forms of police misconduct, such as perjury, are prevalent, perhaps
even more prevalent than police brutality.139 There is commonly an unwritten code within the walls
of the police department which prevents police officers from testifying truthfully on the stand if it
would implicate problematic conduct of a fellow officer.140 However, the idea that police can use
excessive force without facing repercussions is a much more pressing issue to the public, and
therefore should be the primary concern of removal to an independent prosecutor.141
“There is a broad range of injuries between a suspect’s broken wrist and an officer-involved
fatality.”142 Therefore, the next question is whether cases should be removed to an independent
prosecutor in all cases of excessive force or only in cases involving the death of a civilian. The
answer to this question will likely vary from area to area based on size and needs.143 With that
being said, to ensure that justice is served in cases of officer-involved fatalities, it may be best to
start by limiting jurisdiction only to those cases of officer-involved fatalities, and to continue to
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allow the district attorney’s office to prosecute all other cases of police misconduct for the time
being. This will allow the independent prosecutor to focus their resources on the most serious cases
in which police kill civilians.144
The final question is whether cases should be removed to an independent prosecutor only
in cases whether the civilian was unarmed. The executive order issued by Governor Cuomo limited
the appointment of the attorney general as special prosecutor to cases involving the death of an
unarmed civilian, or where there is significant question as to whether the civilian was armed at the
time of their death.145 However, since this executive order was enacted, critics have argued that
the order is too narrow, and that the scope should be broadened to allow the attorney general to
have jurisdiction over all cases of excessive use of force, whether the deceased was armed or not.146
To demonstrate why the scope should be broadened, take the case of Deborah Danner, a sixty-sixyear-old emotionally disturbed woman who was fatally shot in a confrontation with an NYPD
officer in October 2016.147 The attorney general’s office determined that the case did not fall under
its jurisdiction because she was holding a baseball bat during the confrontation; therefore, the case
was left to be handled by the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office.148 Overall, the scope should
be expanded to all cases in which an officer kills a civilian, because even in cases in which a
civilian is “armed,” the fatality may not necessarily be justified and an independent investigation
from an objective source is required.149
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C. Arguments Against Appointing an Independent Prosecutor
Police power and crime control has generally been a local matter throughout United States
history.150 In New York, there are sixty-two counties and each has a district attorney elected to
serve and enforce the law in that local area.151 The main argument against appointing an
independent prosecutor, in any form, is that it strips the elected district attorney of power to serve
their community.152 Former District Attorney “Ken Thompson of Brooklyn said he and his
counterparts would be ‘robbed’ of their right to enforce the law locally.”153 Further, by appointing
an independent prosecutor, the district attorney’s office is essentially conceding that their office is
incapable of handling those cases and fulfilling its mission, thereby sending a message of
illegitimacy to its constituents.154 Part of the entire issue of this conflict of interest and perception
of bias is that it undermines the trust in the criminal justice system.155 If appointing an independent
prosecutor may lead the public to question the district attorney’s office’s legitimacy, perhaps we
are doing more harm than good. However, we are only removing cases to an independent
prosecutor in a very small number of instances, and overall the public will likely gain more trust
in seeing that the district attorney’s office is taking action to acknowledge the perception of bias
rather than being concerned that they are losing any legitimacy.156
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V.

CONCLUSION

While the use of an independent, special prosecutor is certainly not going to solve the
problem of police brutality entirely, removing the conflict of interest that is inherent when the
district attorney’s office prosecutes local law enforcement will help ensure that police officers are
held accountable.157 It is also an important step towards rebuilding trust many communities are
currently lacking in police, prosecutors, and the criminal justice system as a whole. 158 In order to
ensure that the system is fair and just, assistant district attorneys must step back and allow an
unbiased, neutral prosecutor to investigate cases of police involved fatalities.159
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